One well-documented p a t t e r n i n l o c a l p u b l i c f i n a n c e i s t h a t , i n comparison w i t h what i s spent o u t o f r e s i d e n t s ' p r i v a t e income, a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e amount o f the lump-sum a i d received from h i g h e r l e v e l s o f government i s used t o increase expenditures r a t h e r than reduce l o c a l taxes. This paper shows how a b u r e a u c r a t i c model o f t h e type suggested by Niskanen (1971) can be used t o e x p l a i n t h i s behavior. A t e s t o f the model, u s i n g 115 small c i t y governments i n Michigan, f i n d s t h a t the bureaucratic model explains c a p i t a l expenditures w e l l , w h i l e o p e r a t i n g expenditures appear t o be b e t t e r explained by the standard median v o t e r model.
-2-the p r i c e i t pays f o r p u b l i c goods) might be d i s t o r t e d by i n e f f i c i e n c i e s created
by the government agencies t h a t a c t u a l l y produce p u b l i c goods. This p o s s i b i l i t y i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important because the median v o t e r model's c h i e f r i v a l i n the p u b l i c choice l i t e r a t u r e i s a s e t o f " bureaucratic" t h e o r i e s of government behavior. I n these models, p u b l i c bureaus are seen as e x e r c i s i n g monopoly c o n t r o l over p u b l i c l y produced goods and services. They use t h i s monopoly power t o coerce e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s i n t o approving l a r g e r budgets a t higher cost per u n i t than would otherwise occur, t o enhance the personal p r e s t i g e , income, and power o f the bureaucrat.
A second problem w i t h the use o f the median v o t e r model involves a consequence o f the model t h a t i s c o n s i s t e n t l y r e f u t e d by e m p i r i c a l t e s t s .
Bradford and Oates (1971) have shown t h a t , under a system o f m a j o r i t y r u l e v o t i n g , the e f f e c t s o f any system o f revenue sharing can be d u p l i c a t e d by a s e t of g r a n t s t o i n d i v i d u a l s i n the community o f the same amount, because the c r u c i a l median v o t e r faces the same budget c o n s t r a i n t i n e i t h e r case.
E m p i r i c a l l y , t h i s theorem i m p l i e s t h a t increases i n noncategorical
g r a n t s t o the community, when a p p r o p r i a t e l y weighted by the median v o t e r ' s t a x share, ought t o s t i m u l a t e the same amount of spending as increases i n h i s income. I n separate surveys o f the e f f e c t o f a i d on spending, Gramlich (1977) and F i s h e r (1982) note t h a t t h i s equivalence i s c o n s i s t e n t l y r e j e c t e d by the data--a lump-sum a i d increase o f $1 generates more expenditure than an income increase o f T d o l l a r s . This phenomenon has been dubbed the " flypaper e f f e c t " , since revenue sharing money s t i c k s i n the p u b l i c sector where i t f i r s t enters the community, instead o f being d i s t r i b u t e d t o the p r i v a t e sector i n the form o f lower taxes. This paper shows how these bureaucratic theories can be used t o modify t h e median v o t e r model t o e x p l a i n flypaper effects.
The i n t u i t i o n behind the -3-r e s u l t s i s q u i t e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d : having a d d i t i o n a l p r i v a t e income a l t e r s the median v o t e r ' s bargaining p o s i t i o n w i t h respect t o l o c a l bureaus i n a way t h a t a d d i t i
o n a l lump-sum a i d does n o t . Section I 1 e x p l a i n s the nature o f f l y p a p e r e f f e c t s . Section I11 d e t a i l s the p a r t i c u l a r s o f the model, beginning w i t h the assumptions on which i t i s based. Section I V presents an e m p i r i c a l t e s t , using expenditure data from 115 small c i t y governments i n Michigan. The a r t i c l e concludes w i t h some b r i e f comments about extensions o f the model.
11
. Flypaper E f f e c t s Figure 1 , adapted from Bradford and Oates (19711, i l l u s t r a t e s the p r e c i s e meaning o f the f l y p a p e r e f f e c t . An u n r e s t r i c t e d g r a n t o f amount A pushes o u t the median v o t e r ' s budget c o n s t r a i n t as shown, b u t leaves i t s slope unaffected. Since t h i s slope i s equal t o the median v o t e r ' s tax share ( l a b e l e d T I , an income increase o f amount TA r e s u l t s i n e x a c t l y the same f i n a l budget c o n s t r a i n t as t h a t under the a i d increase. As l o n g as the v o t e r ' s preferences are independent o f the elements of t h i s budget c o n s t r a i n t , the same e q u i l i b r i u m expenditure on p u b l i c and p r i v a t e goods should occur. I n t h i s sense, the a i d increase o f A i s equivalent, under the median v o t e r model, t o an income increase o f the amount TA.
Another way o f l o o k i n g a t t h i s r e s u l t i s t h a t the median voter, as a p a r t i c i p a n t i n the l o c a l decision-making process, can c l a i m some p o r t i o n o f the 
Pub1 ic Expenditures
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper Best available copy -5-expenditure a t an exchange r a t e equal t o h i s t a x share. Since t h e funds are p e r f e c t l y f u n g i b l e , the value o f h i s " p u b l i c income" (TA) can simply be added t o h i s p r i v a t e income (Y) t o get h i s e f f e c t i v e income (Z): I n e l a s t i c i t y terms, t h i s can be r e w r i t t e n as:
However, as Fisher (1982) demonstrates, these t h e o r e t i c a l equivalences are, on the whole, n o t supported by the data. O f the eleven studies surveyed by Fisher, o n l y one f a i l e d t o f i n d evidence o f f l y p a p e r e f f e c t s . I n the case o f s t u d i e s r e p o r t i n g marginal e f f e c t s , the expenditure e f f e c t o f lump-sum a i d ranged from $0.20 t o $1.60 l a r g e r than p r e d i c t e d by the theory. For those s t u d i e s r e p o r t i n g e l a s t i c i t i e s , the expenditure e f f e c t s were from zero t o 71 percent l a r g e r than expected. Moreover, f l y p a p e r e f f e c t s r e s u l t s occurred by the l o c a l bureaus, and i t s p r i c e t o t h e community i s P,.
The b u r e a u c r a t ' s i n f o r m a t i o n advantage over c i t y council gives him
power over the c i t y ' s expenditure decisions. I n t h e extreme case, which i s modeled here, the c i t y council has no i n f o r m a t i o n whatever about the c o s t o f a l t e r n a t i v e t o bureau production might be, i t i s associated w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r u t i l i t y l e v e l f o r the median voter, which I w i l l l a b e l UX. I n order t o ensure i t s s u r v i v a l , then, the aggregate bureau must n o t push the median v o t e r ' s u t i l i t y l e v e l below UX.
A l g e b r a i c a l l y , i t i s easy t o show t h a t , under t h i s model, the f o l lowing e q u a l i t y i s always s a t i s f i e d :
where: 
) ( u t i l i t y c o n~t r a i n t ) .~ Since u t i l i t y i s monotonic i n X I , c o n d i t i o n c can be i n v e r t e d t o get XI = f(X2,UX). W e can s u b s t i t u t e f o r XI i n c o n d i t i o n a, and when
This t e l l s us t h e maximum p r i c e t h a t the bureau can charge a t each X 2 .
S u b s t i t u t i n g t h i s i n t o the c o s t c o n s t r a i n t (b) y i e l d s equation (4).
The top panel o f f i g u r e 2 i l l u s t r a t e s the geometry o f equation (41, whi 1 e a1 so demonstrati ng an a d d i t i o n a l necessary condi t i o n f o r maximi z a t i o n i n t h e model. Not o n l y must t h e t o t a l revenue and t o t a l c o s t curves i n t e r s e c t , b u t the t o t a l revenue f u n c t i o n must c u t through the t o t a l c o s t f u n c t i o n from below. Under normal circumstances, the t o t a l revenue f u n c t i o n ,
i s a hyperbola t h q t i s asymptotic t o the d o l l a r a x i s and t h e l i n e TR = YIT + A. For t h e case o f constant marginal c o s t , i t cuts the t o t a l c o s t l i n e i n two places, b u t o n l y t h e second i n t e r s e c t i o n maximizes t h e budget. Formally, -f , / T ( t h e slope o f t h e TR 1 i n e , where f , represents the d e r i v a t i v e o f f w i t h r e s p e c t t o i t s f i r s t argument) must be l e s s than c 1 ( X 2 ) ( t h e slope o f the TC l i n e ) . Otherwise, t h e bureau should be a b l e to expand f u r t h e r , s i n c e a d d i t i o n a l o u t p u t w i l T cover i t s costs.
The bottom h a l f o f f i g u r e 2 compares t h e outcome o f t h i s b u r e a u c r a t i c model t o the median v o t e r model f o r the case of constant marginal costs.
Equation (5) describes t h e locus o f a l l p o i n t s i n the (P2, XZ) space t h a t g i v e t h e median v o t e r u t i l i t y l e v e l U: . Although Niskanen c a l l s t h i s
l o c u s the "marginal value f u n c t i o n , " and P a t i n k i n ( i n another c o n t e x t ) c a l l s i t t h e " all-or-none" demand curve ( P a t i n k i n 1963, pp. 83-8>, I w i l l use t h e t e r m average b e n e f i t (AB) curve. As my terminology i m p l i e s (and d e s p i t e
Niskanen's imprecise use o f t h e term marginal i n t h i s c o n t e x t ) , t h i s AB curve i s r e l a t e d t o the Hicksian demand ( o r marginal b e n e f i t ) f u n c t i o r l as average i s r e l a t e d t o marginal. Total revenue (P2X2) a t any p o i n t on t h i s AB curve w i l l always be equal t o the area under t h e corresponding H i c k s i a n demand curve.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper Best available copy -10- The AB curve should n o t be confused w i t h more common k i n d s o f demand curves i n economics, such as t h e H i c k s i a n and M a r s h a l l i a n ( o r o r d i n a r y ) demand curves. I n t h e s p i r i t o f b i n a r y choice j u s t described, t h e AB curve does n o t assume t h a t t h e consumer a d j u s t s h i s purchases t o maximize h i s welfare.
Rather, f o r every g i v e n P 2 , t h e curve r e l a t e s how much t o t a l o u t p u t t h e bureau can f o r c e t h e consumer to accept and pay for b e f o r e t h e consumer decides t o abandon t h e bureau e n t i r e l y . The curve slopes downward because t h e consumer-voter w i l l a l l o w a l i t t l e more a l l o c a t i v e i n e f f i c i e n c y ( i . e . , he i s f o r c e d t o buy more goods than he would l i k e a t t h e p r e v a i l i n g p r i c e ) i n exchange f o r a l i t t l e l e s s p r o d u c t i v e i n e f f i c i e n c y ( i . e . , a p r i c e c l o s e r t o t r u e c o s t ) .
As f i g u r e 2 shows, o u t p u t under t h e budget-maximizing model i s a l l o c a t i v e l y , b u t n o t p r o d u c t i v e l y , i n e f f i c i e n t f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f t h e median v o t e r . The median v o t e r model d i c t a t e s o u t p u t XTv a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n o f t h e marginal c o s t and o r d i n a r y demand curves; t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c model p r e d i c t s o u t p u t X: a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n o f t h e average c o s t and AB curves. Output i s produced a t c o s t ( s o c(X,) = E, where E = e x p e n d i t u r e s ) , b u t r e l a t i v e t o t h e median v o t e r case t o o many u n i t s o f p u b l i c goods a r e
produced, and t h e b u r e a u ' s budget i s t o o l a r g e .
The Niskanen model has two well-known comparative s t a t i c r e s u l t s : f i r s t , o u t p u t i s always c o s t -e l a s t i c ; and second, a $1 i n c r e a s e i n lump-sum a i d w i l l generate more than a $1 i n c r e a s e i n expenditures ( f o r p r o o f s i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e c u r r e n t f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e model, see Wyckoff [19841) .
Here I concentrate on a new i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e model i n t h e l o c a l government case: i t s g e n e r a t i o n o f f l y p a p e r e f f e c t s . Loosely p u t , these occur because 
I n more i n t u i t i v e terms, p r i v a t e income increases improve the v o t e r ' s bargaining p o s i t i o n i n budget discussions, b u t increases i n a i d do not. As an analogy, note t h a t t h e outcome o f n e g o t i a t i o n s between management and l a b o r
o f t e n depend upon t h e s u f f e r i n g each side w i l l endure i f no agreement i s reached. I f management can demonstrate t h a t i t i s n o t unduly harmed by the shutdown o f i t s f a c i l i t i e s ( t h a t i s , i t s U; i s high) i t can o f t e n take a tougher n e g o t i a t i n g stance and f o r c e concessions from the workers.
The reader may a l s o see p a r a l l e l s here w i t h the papers by Romer and Rosenthal (1980) and Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal (19821, where i t was shown t h a t , i f the s t a t e imposes a " reversion l e v e l " on the decisions o f a budget-maximizing school board--a l e v e l o f taxes and expenditures t h a t would p r e v a i l i f v o t e r s f a i l e d t o approve the d i s t r i c t ' s tax levy--spending outcomes can be a f f e c t e d by any change t h a t occurs i n t h a t r e v e r s i o n l e v e l . Here, Uz amounts t o a " n a t u r a l " r e v e r s i o n l e v e l , n o t imposed by the s t a t e , b u t by the circumstances faced by the median v o t e r . An increase i n income increases the u t i l i t y o f t h i s r e v e r s i o n l e v e l and f o r c e s the bureau t o http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper Best available copy
-1 3-r e s t r a i n i t s budget demands, w h i l e t h e a i d i n c r e a s e does n o t . ' To prove t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n , n o t e t h a t , as l o n g as t h e c o s t f u n c t i o n C = c(X2) i s monotonic, t h e r e e x i s t s an i n v e r s e f u n c t i o n X2 = g(C), which maps c o s t i n t o a unique l e v e l o f o u t p u t . Then t h e Niskanen model can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by:
(6) C = A + (Y -fCg(C), U;I)/T.
Therefore:
( 7 1 ac/aA = 1 -( f l g l / T ) a c / a A .
But, s i n c e g i s an i n v e r s e f u n c t i o n , g ' = l / c l . S u b s t i t u t i o n and rearrangement r e s u l t i n :
a c / a~ = i / ( i + ~, / T c I ) .
/ T h i s means t h a t : With r e s p e c t t o y, d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f e q u a t i o n ( 4 ) can be performed i n e x a c t l y I V . An Empirical Test o f the Model

A. Addi t i o n a l Assumptions
To t e s t the model j u s t described, f o u r addi t i o n a l assumptions are made. A l l o f these assumptions are more o r l e s s standard i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e on t e s t i n g the median v o t e r model (see, f o r example, Borcherding and Deacon
[I9721 and Bergstrom and Goodman C19731). (A.5) The cost f u n c t i o n f o r production o f p u b l i c f a c i l i t i e s e x h i b i t s constant marginal and average costs. The c o s t o f another u n i t o f f a c i l i t i e s may v a r y across j u r i s d i c t i o n s , b u t i t does n o t vary w i t h t h e l e v e l o f o u t p u t i n any p a r t i c u l a r j u r i s d i c t i o n . (A.6) U n i t s o f p u b l i c f a c i l i t i e s and u n i t s o f p u b l i c services are r e l a t e d by the f o l l o w i n g " s h a r i n g f u n c t i o n " :
where X L = the q u a n t i t y o f l o c a l p u b l i c services provided, X i = the q u a n t i t y o f l o c a l p u b l i c f a c i l i t i e s provided, n = the p o p u l a t i o n of t h e c i t y , and a = a crowding parameter ( t o be determined by t h e data), which equals z e r o when l o c a l pub1 i c goods are pure p u b l i c goods and 1 when they are pure p r i v a t e goods.
This s p e c i f i c a t i o n allows l o c a l p u b l i c goods t o be "impure." (A.7) The median v o t e r i s p a r t o f the household w i t h median f a m i l y i ncome f o r the commun i t y .
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-1 5-(A.8) The median v o t e r owns the house w i t h median value f o r the c i t y , and t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s h i s e n t i r e h o l d i n g o f taxable p r o p e r t y . Also, the median v o t e r bears no p a r t o f t h e taxes p a i d by
Bergstrom and Goodman show t h a t , as long as t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f incomes w i t h i n each subgroup having d i s t i n c t demands ( i . e . , homeowners and r e n t e r s ) i s p r o p o r t i o n a l across c i t i e s , median q u a n t i t y demanded w i l l be a l o g -l i n e a r f u n c t i o n o f median income i n each c i t y and the p r o p o r t i o n o f c i t i z e n s belonging t o each group (see Bergstrom and Goodman C19731 pp. 295-6). The Bergstrom and Goodman methodology i s f o l l o w e d i n t h i s paper by i n c l u d i n g
percentage owner-occupied, percentage nonwhite, and percentage aged 65 and over among the independent v a r i a b l e s i n the e s t i m a t i n g equation.
B. Estimated Equation and Test Procedures
The f o l l o w i n g f u n c t i o n a l form was used i n t e s t i n g the model:
I n E , = b o + b, I n POP, + b, I n TI + b3 I n Z , b4 I n INCRATIO, + b s I n OTHERAID, + b6 DENSITY, + b7 PEROWN i + be PERNONW 1 + bs PER65AO I + E 1 , where E l = expenditures on a l l f u n c t i o n s except u t i l i t i e s (water, e l e c t r i c i t y , gas, and t r a n s i t systems) and h e a l t h ( i n c l u d i n g 
TI = t a x share of t h e median v o t e r . T I equals median house value, 1970, d i v i d e d by 2 times s t a t e e q u a l i z e d v a l u a t i o n f o r t h e community, 1970 ( i n Michigan, s t a t e e q u a l i z e d v a l u a t i o n i s s e t a t one-half o f t h e t r u e cash v a l u e o f p r o p e r t y ) ; t o t a l income o f t h e median v o t e r , b o t h p u b l i c and p r i v a t e ;
Z I = median f a m i l y income, 1970 + TI * REVSHARE,. a n c e t e r m w i t h z e r o mean and f i n i t e variance.The e r r o r term r e f l e c t s f o u r random elements i n t h e model:
REVSHARE, = t h e t o t a l amount o f s t a t e and f e d e r a l revenue s h a r i n g r e c e i v e d by t h e community. REVSHARE[ i n c l u d e s a1 1 a i d g i v e n f o r general l o c a l government support ( f o r example, d i s t r i b u t i o n s f r o m t h e s t a t e s a l e s t a x ) , b u t n o t money g r a n t e d f o r s p e c i f i c c a t e g o r i e s o f e x p e n d i t u r e ( f o r example, money f r o m s t a t e g a s o l i n e taxes t h a t a r e earmarked f o r s t r e e t and highway e x p e n d i t u r e s ) . INCRATIOI = t h e p r o p o r t i o n of
1) e r r o r s on t h e p a r t o f t h e b u r e a u c r a t i n p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e demands o f t h e median v o t e r because h i s knowledge o f these demands i s imperfect ,
2 ) d i f f e r e n c e s i n t a s t e s and p r e f e r e n c e s among median v o t e r s because t h e v o t e r ' s demands a r e n o t u n i q u e l y determined by h i s income, t a x share, and t h e f e a t u r e s o f h i s community,
3) e r r o r s due t o t h e uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p i t a l o u t l a y s , s i n c e c a p i t a l spending, r a t h e r than t h e t r u e value o f d e p r e c i a t i o n , i s i n c l u d e d i n e x p e n d i t u r e s , and
4) d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e t r u e c o s t o f p r o d u c i n g p u b l i c goods across communities, which may a f f e c t b o t h t h e demand o f t h e median v o t e r and. t h e p r i ce charged f o r c i t y s e r v i c e s .
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The e x i s t e n c e o f b u r e a u c r a t i c power i n c i t y e x p e n d i t u r e d e c i s i o n s was t e s t e d u s i n g a two-part methodology i n v o l v i n g t h e parameters b l and b 4 .
The importance o f b, hinges on t h e unusual r o l e o f t h e v a r i a b l e POP i n t h e e m p i r i c a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n j u s t described. P o p u l a t i o n has no p l a c e i n t h e model p e r se; i t s o n l y r o l e i s i n a f f e c t i n g 
L e t 6 be t h e c i t y ' s c o s t e l a s t i c i t y o f e x p e n d i t u r e on p u b l i c goods. Then, t h e p r i c e component o f t h e e s t i m a t i n g e q u a t i o n would t h e o r e t i c a l l y be:
(13) 6 I n ell = 6 I n c o l n a = 6 I n c o i + 6a I n n. Table 1 shows t h e r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d when o r d i n a r y l e a s t squares i s used t o estimate t h e e q u a t i o n d e s c r i b e d above, u s i n g c u r r e n t expenditures o n l y .
If t h e unobservable c o l a r e randomly d i s t r i b u t e d and independent o f t h e o t h e r v a r i a b l e s on t h e r i g h t -h a n
The v a r i a b l e s i n logs--POP, T, Z, INCRATIO, OTHERAID--all have t h e signs t h a t might be a n t i c i p a t e d , g i v e n t h e model developed above. Increases i n p o p u l a t i o n , income, non-revenue-sharing a i d , and t h e r a t i o o f revenue s h a r i n g t o t o t a l income a l l t e n d t o i n c r e a s e expenditure, w h i l e increases i n t h e t a x share tend t o reduce spending. The o v e r a l l f i t o f t h e r e g r e s s i o n appears t o be very good, as demonstrated by a R-squared of 0.940.
The r e s u l t s summarized i n t a b l e 1 a r e f a i r l y t y p i c a l o f s t u d i e s o f l o c a l p u b l i c choice. The estimates o f p o p u l a t i o n , income, and t a x share e l a s t i c i t i e s a r e a l l w i t h i n t h e ranges s e t up by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) u s i n g separate r e g r e s s i o n s f o r each o f several s t a t e s . As i s usual i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e , t h e income e l a s t i c i t y i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y l a r g e r than t h e t a x share e l a s t i c i t y i n a b s o l u t e value. Although h i g h e r than average, t h e e s t i m a t e o f the e f f e c t o f revenue s h a r i n g on e x p e n d i t u r e i s w e l l w i t h i n t h e range found by F i s h e r (1982); l i k e w i s e , t h e estimates f o r TaEIaY a r e s i m i l a r t o t h e estimates summarized t h e r e . Most i m p o r t a n t l y , however, t h e t a b l e shows t h a t , w i t h r e s p e c t t o c u r r e n t expenditures, t h e c o e f f i c i e n t on b, i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m z e r o w h i l e t h e c o e f f i c i e n t on b, i s n o t . Although t h e d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t i s t i c s a t t h e bottom o f t h e t a b l e suggest t h a t f l y p a p e r e f f e c t s e x i s t , these t e s t s r e j e c t t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c model, w h i l e n o t r e j e c t i n g the median v o t e r model. Table 2 p r e s e n t s t h e r e s u l t s when t h e independent v a r i a b l e s d e s c r i b e d above a r e used i n a r e g r e s s i o n on c a p i t a l expenditures alone ( o u t l a y s f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n , equipment, and l a n d ) . As would be expected, t h e f i t o f t h e equation i s n o t as good f o r c a p i t a l expenditures as f o r c u r r e n t expenditures; Table 2 Empi r i c a l Resul ts--Capi t a l E x p e n d i t u r e s Std. e r r o r t -s t a t . NOTE: Ten o f t h e c i t i e s i n t h e sample r e p o r t e d no c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s a t a l l . T h i s p r e s e n t e d a problem, s i n c e t h e dependent v a r i a b l e i s t h e l o g o f e x p e n d i t u r e s . The e s t i m a t e s above r e s u l t when these c i t i b s ) a r e l a r g e r i n a b s o l u t e value than they were f o r t h e r e g r e s s i o n on c u r r e n t expenditures--suggesting t h a t c a p i t a l expenditures a r e more s e n s i t i v e t o t h e economic and f i n a n c i a l environment o f t h e c i t y . Most i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e t e s t s now r e j e c t t h e median v o t e r model b u t f a i l t o r e j e c t t h e Niskanen model, s i n c e b, i s p o s i t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t , w h i l e b, t u r n s n e g a t i v e b u t i s n o t s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t .
The bottom o f t a b l e 2 c o n t a i n s a d d i t i o n a l evidence of b u r e a u c r a t i c power.
Under t h e median v o t e r model, a $1 i n c r e a s e i n REVSHARE ought t o be equal t o T times t h e e f f e c t o f a $1 i n c r e a s e i n p r i v a t e income. However, e v a l u a t e d a t sample medians, TBEIBY equals $0.0055 w h i l e aE1aREVSHARE equals $0.7479. The data, then, show t h a t l a r g e f l y p a p e r e f f e c t s occur i n t h e sample. Moreover, t h e r e s t r i c t i o n under t h e budget-maximization model t h a t aE1aREVSHARE > 1 i s n o t v i o l a t e d a t sample medians; adding up t h e marginal p r o p e n s i t i e s t o consume o u t o f a i d f o r c u r r e n t and c a p i t a l expenditures r e s u l t s i n aE1aREVSHARE = $1.306.
These r e s u l t s suggest t h a t a dichotomy e x i s t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c u r r e n t and c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e behavior o f l o c a l governments. Although many e x p l a n a t i o n s o f t h i s e f f e c t a r e p o s s i b l e , i t seems p l a u s i b l e t h a t t h e e x t r a c o m p l e x i t y o f c a p i t a l expenditures, a l o n g w i t h t h e i r a b i l i t y t o be f i n a n c e d through debt, m i g h t a l l o w t h e bureaucrat t o g e t more o f what he wants i n t h i s case.
A word o r two of c a u t i o n ought t o accompany t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f r e s u l t s .
Although i n t h e j o i n t t e s t performed above, t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c model c l e a r l y dominates t h e median v o t e r model i n t h e case o f c a p i t a l expenditures, t h e s i n g l e parameter b, i s n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m zero. This r a i s e s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t another, competing model e x i s t s t h a t might dominate t h e http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper Best available copy -2 3-bureaucratic model by e x p l a i n i n g f l y p a p e r e f f e c t s w i t h o u t imposing the c o n s t r a i n t t h a t b , 5 0. I t i s , however, d i f f i c u l t t o imagine what t h a t model might be. I t has been argued t h a t f l y p a p e r e f f e c t s I n t h i s context, i t should be noted t h a t the dichotomy observed between o p e r a t i n g and c a p i t a l expenditures has been p r e v i o u s l y noted i n the l i t e r a t u r e . Nathan, Manvel, and Calkins (1975>, i n t h e i r study o f the e f f e c t s o f revenue sharing on s t a t e and l o c a l governments, suggest t h a t i n the f i r s t few years o f the revenue sharing program, these governments were concerned about the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t these funds might e v e n t u a l l y be c u t o f f by the f e d e r a l government. For t h i s reason, they tended t o use t h i s money f o r one-time c a p i t a l p r o j e c t s r a t h e r than f o r e x t r a c u r r e n t services t h a t would have t o be maintained i n the event t h a t revenue sharing was n o t renewed.
However, although the suggestion o f Nathan, Manvel, and Calkins helps e x p l a i n why the c i t y council might be p a r t i c u l a r l y w i l l i n g t o accede t o t h e b u r e a u c r a t ' s demands i n the area o f c a p i t a l expenditures, i t i s n o t a complete e x p l a n a t i o n o f the p a t t e r n s observed i n t h i s paper. I t does n o t e x p l a i n , f o r
